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Chapter 5
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: RISKS
AND CHALLENGES FOR THE
EURO AREA
1. Introduction
The current crisis has led many analysts to re-assess
the role of the euro. At face value, the euro area has
done relatively well at avoiding the massive finan-
cial crisis of the Anglo-Saxon countries. Does the
crisis prove the virtues of the euro, or can it be a
source of tensions that stress the viability of the
monetary union? In this chapter we discuss these
issues. We acknowledge that membership in the
euro area has helped to eliminate the possibility of
a “twin crisis”, i.e. a joint banking and balance of
payment crisis in the member countries. To the
extent that such crises are self-fulfilling rather than
driven by fundamentals, this is unambiguously ben-
eficial. On the other hand, the crisis brings about
some scenarios that may be problematic for the
euro area. One such scenario is a rapid, excess
appreciation of the euro reflecting a flight out of
US assets. Another is a balance-of-payments crisis
in Central and Eastern European countries. Despite
the fact that these countries are not members of the
monetary union, they are slated to join some day,
and financial and macroeconomic fragility there
affects the euro area.
Finally, we document a number of asymmetries and
imbalances between the core members of the mone-
tary union, in particular with respect to inflation
differentials and net foreign asset positions. It is
unclear whether the crisis has exacerbated or damp-
ened these asymmetries. But the evolution of
spreads in government yields during the crisis sug-
gests that the credibility of the euro area is not
absolute. It is plausible that these asymmetries,
while not accentuated by the crisis, undermine the
credibility of the area, which itself becomes more of
an issue in times of crisis. That is, a shrinking eco-
nomic activity may make imbalances such as low
competitiveness, high trade deficits or high public
debt more problematic, which increases the likeli-
hood of an exit from the euro area or of a default
on public debt. The rise of the spreads during the
crisis suggests that over a ten-year horizon and for a
peripheral country, markets do not consider those
possibilities as rare events. 
One case in point is Greece. In December 2009, its
sovereign debt was downgraded to BBB. The spreads
shot up again as debt is quickly growing well beyond
100 percent of GDP, while low competitiveness due to
past cumulated inflation differentials makes it difficult
to exit the recession. Possible scenarios include out-
right default, exiting the euro area, or a bail-out from
core euro countries. None of these scenarios is
favourable for the euro. A bail-out can be especially
problematic if it fails to prevent contagion to other,
much larger economies with a public debt overhang,
such as Belgium or Italy, for which a bail-out would
be too costly. 
2. The international transmission of the crisis
Historically, macroeconomic shocks that originate
in the United States eventually spread to Europe,
but this happens with a substantial lag. Typically,
the transmission is thought to take place through
international trade.1 Essentially, a recession in the
US is associated with a fall in import demand by US
consumers, which reduces the demand for foreign-
produced goods and thus depresses aggregate
demand in the rest of the world. The effect is small
because the share of imports in consumption expen-
ditures is not very large; and it is associated to a lag
because it takes some time for consumers to rebal-
ance their expenditure and for exporters to realise
that demand has fallen and to adjust their employ-
ment and production decisions. Thus, Krugman
(2008) has argued that for aggregate demand in the
rest of the world to be reduced by 1 percent, the US
would need to be in a recession where output has
fallen by 8 percent.
1 The academic literature on the international transmission of busi-
ness cycles is large. The reader may refer to Clark and van Wincoop
(2001), Canova and Dellas (1993), or Calderon (2008).In that respect, the recent crisis seems unique in that
despite having originated in the United States, its
transmission to the euro area has been instantaneous
and the magnitude of the recession has been of the
same order as in the US. The reason for this unusual
pattern is that the transmission mechanism is differ-
ent; due to financial globalisation, there now exists an
international financial transmission mechanism of
macroeconomic disturbances, and this mechanism is
more rapid than the traditional one. Thus, the world
economy is now in a regime where economies are
more interdependent and react more quickly to
shocks in other countries. 
The increased financial interdependence is illustrated
in Figure 5.1 (taken from Krugman), which shows
that in three decades the level of foreign assets in the
balance sheet of financial institution has been multi-
plied by 5 relative to world GDP. Similarly, a 2007
study finds a portfolio exposure of French banks to
US assets equal to 22 percent, to which one may want
to add a 15 percent exposure to UK assets.
That the transmission of the crisis is now synchro-
nised is evidenced by the synchronisation of the
responses of stock markets and real economic vari-
ables across economic blocks in the current crisis, as is
depicted in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.
The mechanism underlying the financial transmis-
sion of the crisis lies in the balance sheet of interna-
tional investors and its effect on asset prices. Those in
turn affect the “financial accelerator”, which is the
transmission mechanism from the financial to the
real sector. 
Financial institutions must hold
a fraction of their liabilities in the
form of equity rather than debt,
generally for regulatory reasons.
Because their portfolios are val-
ued at market prices, when mar-
ket prices fall, they have trouble
matching their regulatory ratios
if they are leveraged. This is
essentially because their equity,
which is equal to the value of
their assets minus their debt, is
more sensitive to stock prices
than their total assets, because
debt, which does not fall with
stock prices, is subtracted from
total assets when computing
equity. This is illustrated by the following example.
Suppose an investor has 10 shares, worth 10 each,
financed with equity of 40 and debt of 60. The total
value of the portfolio is equal to 100. If stock prices
fall by 20 percent, equity falls to 10 * 8 – 60 = 20, i.e.
it falls by 50 percent. The ratio of equity over total
portfolio value falls from 40 percent to 20/80 = 25 per-
cent. Assuming the firm wants to restore that ratio,
short of getting new capital, for example by issuing
new shares, it must sell assets to reduce its debt – this
is the essence of the deleveraging process. Assume it
sells n shares. Then its debt falls to D’= 60 – 8 * n, and
its equity is unchanged at 8 * (10 – n) – (60 – 8 * n)
= 20. To restore a ratio of 20/(20 + D’) = 0.4, we need
D’ = 30, so that the firm needs to sell 3.75 shares. To
fix ideas, let us assume that 4 shares are sold. 
Therefore, a fall in asset prices induces investors to
reduce their portfolio holdings. Note that this in turn
increases the supply of the asset on the market, which
may further exacerbate the initial fall in the price.
Assume now that the investor is internationally diver-
sified, and owns 50 percent of his portfolio in US
shares and 50 percent in euro shares. Assume the price
of those shares is initially equal to 10, and that the
investor owns 5 of each share. The initial value of the
portfolio is 10 * 5 + 10 * 5 = 100, which again we
assume is split between 60 of debt and 40 of equity.
Next, assume that the price of US shares falls to 6. The
new value of the firm’s assets is 6 * 5 + 10 * 5 = 80
again. The investor must again deleverage, and let us
assume that his preferences are such that he wants to
keep an equal proportion of each asset. If he sells n
assets, that will be n/2 of each kind, and the resulting
value of the portfolio is 6 * (5 – n/2) + 10 * (5 – n/2)
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=8   * (10 – n). Debt falls by 6 * n/2 + 10 * n/2 = 8 * n,
and equity is unchanged. These are the same compu-
tations as before, and thus n = 4. The investor dumps
2 US shares and 2 euro shares on the international
market. We now have a fall in euro stock prices, which
deteriorates the balance sheet of investors who hold
those assets. This triggers another wave of deleverag-
ing, which alters both euro and US markets if those
investors also hold US assets. The spiral continues
until a new equilibrium is found.
3. The impact of the crisis on the euro exchange rate
We now discuss how the economic crisis may affect the
likely evolution of the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-
vis the dollar. Potentially, the crisis can have a large
effect on the euro area through massive movements in
nominal exchange rates. We start by discussing the
mechanisms by which the recession and the response
of policy makers may affect the
exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis
other currencies. 
In the United States, the crisis is
characterised by
• A severe contraction in aggre-
gate demand
• A massive policy response, in
the form of
–  Large scale stimulus pack-
ages that may lift the budget
deficit to some 13 percent of
GDP in year 2009.
–  Aggressive cuts in interest
rates by the Fed to a level
close to zero.
These developments have diverg-
ing effects on the exchange rate.
At any point in time, the ex-
change rate clears the market for
foreign exchange. The demand
and supply for foreign exchange
comes from two motives. First,
exporters and importers need to
acquire foreign currency to
finance their purchases, or con-
versely get rid of the foreign cur-
rency they got in international
transactions. Second, portfolio
investors also generate a demand
and a supply for foreign currency
depending on the denominations
of the assets they want to hold in
their portfolio. In particular, their demand for, say,
dollar denominated assets will be greater, the greater
the rate of return on those assets compared to the rest
of the world is. That rate of return is in turn more
favourable when either the rate of return of US assets,
expressed in dollars, goes up, or the dollar is expected
to appreciate. Nowadays, the second motive for for-
eign exchange transactions plays a far greater role
than the first, because the volume of FOREX trade
induced by international capital movements dwarfs
the one associated with international trade in goods
and services. 
Let us now tackle the presumed impact of each aspect
of the US crisis on the euro/dollar exchange rate.
Consider first the fall in aggregate demand. Let us dis-
cuss its impact on the exchange rate by first assuming
that inflation in the US relative to the rest of the
world, as well as rates of returns on assets, are
unchanged. A fall in aggregate demand implies a per-
Figure 5.2
Figure 5.3manent improvement in the US’s
net foreign asset position, as the
US imports less goods from the
rest of the world. Furthermore, it
should be matched by a once-
and-for-all adjustment in the
exchange rate, because any future
movements in the exchange rate
beyond the impact effect of the
shift would be arbitraged away by
financial markets. If the real
exchange rate were to depreciate,
the US trade deficit would im-
prove by even more. If markets
were expecting the US foreign
asset position to be balanced in
the long run before the fall in
aggregate demand, they would now expect it to be
ever-improving. This is clearly not an equilibrium
since the US consumer would eventually want to con-
sume part of that added wealth. Therefore, the fall in
aggregate demand has to be matched by an apprecia-
tion of the real exchange rate, which reflects the asso-
ciated lower demand for US goods. 
However, this argument holds everything else equal,
i.e. assuming that there is no reaction by monetary
authorities to the slump in demand and more general-
ly that the return to US dollar denominated assets
does not fall. In practice we rather expect the latter to
fall, for example because monetary authorities will
reduce interest rates to counteract the recession. This
would then trigger a shift out of US assets and a
depreciation of the dollar – this effect is likely to
dwarf the effect of an expected improvement in the
net foreign asset position. 
Let us now consider the effect of a fiscal expansion.
A fiscal expansion, everything else equal, needs to be
financed; the rate of return on dollar denominated
debt increases, which attracts foreign capital and trig-
gers an appreciation of the exchange rate. This is
what was observed during the 1980s with the so-
called “Reagan”deficits. Again, this is everything else
equal. If markets expect that the additional debt will
be financed by inflation, thus expecting a low return
on US assets, deficits may well trigger capital flight
and a depreciation of the dollar. Finally, a monetary
expansion, by lowering nominal interest rates, makes
it more profitable to exit dollar-denominated assets
in order to invest one’s money elsewhere where
returns are higher, and this leads to a depreciation of
the dollar.
Thus we see that in the current crisis there are forces
for appreciation along with forces for depreciation.
What has actually happened? Figure 5.4 depicts the
evolution of the euro/dollar exchange rate since the
beginning of 2007. We observe three phases:
Initially, the dollar gradually depreciates to end up
below 1.5 dollars per euro. This coincides with the
“pre-crisis” period, during which investors started to
be increasingly worried about global imbalances and
subprime mortgages.
• Then we have another period of appreciation,
which ends in November 2008.
• Finally, a new depreciation period started in
January 2009.
Such evolutions are notoriously difficult to interpret,
in light of the complex forces outlined above. The
expectations of market participants play a key role in
shaping them. One important question for the euro
area is: Can the current trend of depreciation contin-
ue? If so, this would be a mixed blessing, as it would
trigger a substantial appreciation of the euro and a
loss in competitiveness, and therefore make the reces-
sion more persistent in Europe. As documented
below, it is likely that competitiveness problems are
building up in some euro countries, such as Spain,
France and potentially Italy. 
There are some arguments against such a scenario. In
particular, euro-denominated assets are not overall
more attractive than US-denominated ones. His-
torically, monetary conditions in the euro area typi-
cally have been more restrictive than in the United
States. As we have seen in Chapter 1, though, the pre-
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sent difference in interest rates is smaller than ever.
Thus compared to the recent past there is no particu-
lar reason for a portfolio shift in favour of euro assets.
Nor is there any clear evidence that growth prospects
are better in Europe than in the United States: the cri-
sis is at least as severe as in the US, the aging problem
is worse, and, despite the rhetoric of the Lisbon
Agenda, there are no expectations of broad reforms
that might unleash some unexploited growth poten-
tial – if anything, the crisis has postponed such
reforms. Finally, while budget deficits in the US are
substantially higher than in the euro area (See
Chapter 1 and Chapter 4), the initial situation in the
United States is more favourable because its initial
level of public debt is lower. Thus even though the cri-
sis has made the US less attractive than before, it does
not seem to justify a massive portfolio shift in favour
of euro assets. This is further compounded by two
stabilising forces. First, at some point markets seem to
internalise the effect of exchange rate misalignments
on competitiveness and future trade deficits. For
example, in previous EEAG reports we have docu-
mented that the US dollar/euro exchange rate seems
to remain between two boundaries: an upper bound-
ary where a German basket of goods is as expensive
in the US as in Germany (and further euro apprecia-
tion would make it cheaper in the US), and a lower
boundary where the converse is true, i.e. a US basket
of goods is as expensive in Germany as in the US.
Between these two boundaries, a sort of “no-envy”
situation holds, with the German basket being cheap-
er in Germany than in the US, while the US basket of
goods is cheaper in the US. While we lack a firm the-
ory that would account for such an empirical regular-
ity, it is possible that these two critical points capture
somewhat the level of bilateral rates beyond which
massive arbitrage in goods markets would take place,
i.e. beyond which trade imbalances would clearly be
unsustainable. If so, then intertemporal arbitrage by
speculators would prevent the boundaries from being
trespassed. Such an interpretation is consistent with
the halt of the preceding phase of appreciation, when
the euro started falling again after hitting 1.55 dollars
per euro – which is around the level where in the US
the German basket becomes as cheap as the US one.
We should then expect the current phase of apprecia-
tion to stop at around a rate of 1.5. Another stabilis-
ing mechanism is the well-known valuation effect,
which was already discussed in our 2008 report.
Because the US tends to borrow in its own currency,
while it is holding assets (such as equities) that are
real, a depreciation of the dollar reduces the value of
the debt of US citizens relative to their assets.
Consequently, their net debt falls. This tends to
improve its net foreign asset position which, as we
have discussed above, is a force for appreciation; thus,
we have an additional mechanism for correcting an
appreciation of the dollar. In particular, this rules an
insolvency/depreciation spiral out by which as the
dollar depreciates US residents would increasingly be
unable to meet their (foreign-denominated) debt,
which would trigger a run away from US assets and
further depreciation of the currency.2 Such a mecha-
nism has been important in previous episodes in
emerging economies, for example during the Asian
crisis or the Argentinean crisis of the 1990s. As we
discuss below, it is actually more likely to come into
play at the periphery of the euro area than in the
United States. 
Thus there are compelling reasons to rule out both, a
continuation of the appreciation of the euro beyond
1.5–1.6 dollars/euro and a sudden portfolio shift
away from US dollar-denominated assets and in
favour of euro-denominated assets. One scenario that
cannot be ruled out, though, is a sharp rise in expec-
tations of inflation in the US, if say markets antici-
pate persistently high budget deficits and it appears
that inflation will be the most likely form of taxation
that will be used to reduce the burden of debt. Such
a realisation by markets could trigger a sharp drop in
the dollar. In the long run this would not be associat-
ed with competitiveness problems in the euro area:
On average, the rate of depreciation merely offsets
the inflation differential between the two zones.
However, upon impact the drop may indeed cause
competitiveness problems, as the fall in the dollar
reflects expected increases in the US price level that
have not yet materialised. Through imports, such a
fall may exert deflationary pressure in the euro area
which would have contractionary effects through
higher real interest rates, while making it more likely
that a liquidity trap arises. In the longer run, the ECB
will be faced with the dilemma between aligning itself
to US monetary policy, which amounts to importing
US inflation, and fighting an endemic appreciation of
the euro. 
This inflationary scenario is plausible given the mas-
sive liquidity that has been injected in the economy by
the Fed and the poor quality of many of the assets
that it has acquired in exchange for that. However, at
present markets do not anticipate that it will prevail.
If it were to prevail, the nominal yield on 5 year US
2 Such a run would quite often be associated with a bank run, and
therefore one would have a “twin crisis”, as discussed below. treasury bonds would be substantially higher than for
short term maturities, and as we have seen in Chapter
1 this is not observed. This may mean either that mar-
kets do not see an end to the recovery (which would be
necessary to ignite inflation), or that they are confi-
dent in the Fed’s ability to fine tune the rate of infla-
tion when the recovery comes, by gradually reducing
the monetary base. 
4. Is the euro area a safe haven?
There has been much debate regarding whether the
euro area has acted as a successful shelter against
the financial crisis. This argument is motivated by
the experience of Iceland, where the failure of large
banks has led to government insolvency (along with
a collapse of the value of the currency). The role of
a single currency in preventing those outcomes has
to be clarified. Clearly, participating in a currency
union does not reduce the likelihood of a bank run,
insofar as such a run is motivated by the fact that
the bank is not able to pay back all depositors
should it occur, given the illiquidity of the asset side
of its balance sheet. Thus, a priori, financial crises
bear little relation to the exchange rate regime. On
the other hand, macroeconomists have identified
“twin crises”, i.e. episodes where a banking crisis
occurs simultaneously with a balance of payments
crisis (see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999),
Dornbusch et al. (1995), Sachs et al. (1996)). While
this literature is still burgeoning, there are reasons
to believe that there are complementarities between
the two types of crises (which explains that they
both happen at the same time in many cases). More
specifically, if the liabilities of financial institutions
are denominated in foreign cur-
rency, expectations of a sudden
drop in the exchange rate reduce
the solvency of those institu-
tions, which makes it more like-
ly that a run may take place. In
that respect, it is reasonable to
believe that for a number of
small countries in the euro area,
the euro has made a run on the
financial sector less likely, since
it is very unlikely that a massive
fall in the euro would have taken
place, contrary to the case of a
small country with its own cur-
rency where domestic macro-
economic problems can sub-
stantially increase the probability of an attack on
the currency. Thus, Ireland, which had a large expo-
sure to toxic US assets, was spared the problems
experienced by Iceland.
Does that mean that the euro is an unambiguous
blessing? The answer is “no”, and we have three main
reasons for concern:
• The crisis in some non-members has a severe
impact on some members through the depreciation
of those non-members’ currencies.
• The crisis in accession countries generates impor-
tant policy dilemmas that may weaken the euro.
• The fiscal and macroeconomic position of at least
one peripheral member country is straining the
monetary union. 
We discuss these three issues successively.
4.1 Depreciation of contiguous currencies
Essentially, while the euro is overall a blessing in that
it protects some countries against a financial crisis,
as discussed above, its drawback that the European
Monetary Union (EMU) is not an optimal currency
area may be particularly salient under a crisis. This is
because non member countries that trade heavily
with some member countries may experience a large
depreciation of their exchange rate, which will
induce a strong economic contraction in the member
country. In the case of the EMU, two member coun-
tries are in such a situation: Ireland, which trades
heavily with the United Kingdom, and Finland,
which trades heavily with Sweden. Figure 5.5 docu-
ments the very large depreciation of the British
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pound during the crisis as well as the milder depreci-
ation of the Swedish krona. 
These factors certainly play some role in the fact that
Finland and Ireland are the two euro area countries
where the recession has been most severe, with an
estimated contraction of 8.8 percent and 7.5 percent
respectively for 2007.3 Thus, while membership of
the euro area is favourable for financial stability by
shutting down channels for twin crises, it may make
the actual contractionary impact of the crisis more
severe by preventing a quick adjustment of the real
exchange rate. In contrast, non euro countries can
rebalance their economies quite quickly by having a
sharp depreciation. The UK, for example, suffered
from substantial trade deficits and arguably from an
overvalued exchange rate; the quick depreciation of
the pound has gone a long way toward restoring
equilibrium.
4.2 Critical macroeconomic developments in candidate
countries
Another critical issue is the effect of the crisis on
Eastern European countries and the timetable of
those countries’ adoption of the euro. In principle,
these countries have a claim to join the euro after a
period of two years of moderate exchange rate fluc-
tuations, and no devaluation (the so-called ERM-II
arrangement). However, a number of these emerg-
ing countries are particularly vulnerable to the cri-
sis. This is not so much due to their exposure to
toxic assets as to the sharp rise in their foreign-cur-
rency denominated liabilities during the period of
strong growth and imbalances that preceded the
crisis. This generates the risk of self-fulfilling bal-
ance of payment crises, as investors anticipate that
a collapse in the currency would make a lot of
debtors insolvent, and get rid of their domestic
assets. The world recession clearly does not help as
these small countries rely more on exports and are
therefore more vulnerable to a slump in world
aggregate demand. 
To illustrate this, let us take two examples: Latvia
and Hungary (see Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). The rapid
boom in Latvia prior to the crisis was fuelled by
strong capital inflows and international investor
euphoria. As a result, a large stock of foreign debt
was accumulated and up to 90 percent of debt was
denominated in foreign currency (See Stokes (2009));
the boom was associated with a current account
deficit of 25 percent of GDP and the foreign debt
reached 140 percent of GDP. 
To foster early accession to the EMU, Latvia has
adopted a narrow peg to the euro. This leads to the
problem that markets may force a devaluation
because they face a high foreign debt, a poor per-
formance of the economy and a probable overvalu-
ation of the currency. In 2009 the economy con-
tracted at an annual rate of 18 percent. Among the
results is a sharp rise in budget deficits, estimated at
13 percent of GDP, which along with the recession
create expectations of a devaluation. The govern-
ment has received support from the IMF, but due to
the magnitude of the contraction it cannot meet the
conditionality attached to it in terms of fiscal disci-
pline. All these issues are making a self-fulfilling
balance of payments crisis more likely, along with
the rapid appreciation of the real exchange rate that
was accumulated during the period of pegging to
the euro. 
Hungary has experienced similar developments, on a
milder scale: a commitment to a euro peg, strong
growth and large external imbalances, with a preva-
lence of foreign-currency borrowing and again the
risk of a twin crisis. Inflation has been less strong than
in Latvia (Table 5.3) though, and is probably compat-
ible with the exchange rate peg, given the necessary
appreciation of non-traded goods over time vis-à-vis
those prevailing in the euro area. By contrast, infla-
tion in Latvia has been incompatible with the ex-
change rate peg and is now having a sharp contrac-
tionary effect through the loss of competitiveness. As
in other countries, this tends to correct the trade
deficit because imports massively fall; nevertheless,
such rebalancing of external trade only comes at the
cost of an internal recession and does not eliminate
the need for a real depreciation. 
3 See Table 5.
Table e 5.1 1  
Trade e balance/GDP P Hungary y and d Latvia a 
Hungary Latvia
2006Q04  – 7.4  – 29.0 
2007Q01  – 6.5  – 22.4 
2007Q02  – 7.6  – 23.0 
2007Q03  – 6.4  – 25.2 
2007Q04  – 6.3  – 19.1 
2008Q01  – 5.3  – 15.2 
2008Q02  – 5.3  – 15.3 
2008Q03  – 8.5  – 13.0 
2008Q04 –  9.4 –  8.3 
2009Q01 –  1.3  1.2 
Source: Eurostat.Hungary, has maintained high interest rates in order
to defend its currency. For example, throughout 2008
interest rates in Hungary soared from 7 percent to
more than 11 percent and they remained above
9.5 percent throughout most of 2009 (Figure 5.6). The
policy dilemma is clear: either the central bank lowers
interest rates and runs the risk of a depreciation and
a crisis induced by the insolvency of borrowers in for-
eign currency, or it maintains high nominal and real
interest rates and fuels a recession driven by weak
aggregate demand. So far it has chosen the latter
course and the result is a sharp contraction in eco-
nomic activity. Since the peak of the crisis, though,
tensions seem to have eased and the central bank has
managed to reduce its interest rate to 5.5 percent.
In Latvia, monetary authorities have been able so far
to defend the currency peg at a remarkably low cost in
terms of interest rates. This is especially surprising
given that, as shown on Figure 5.7, money market
rates experience large swings that reflect the sensitivi-
ty of market expectations to news regarding the pos-
sibility of a devaluation or a balance of payment cri-
sis (such a disconnect between bank rates and market
rates is not observed in Hungary). It is possible that
covert intervention by the ECB to defend the Latvian
currency (lats) explains such a pattern. 
How do the macroeconomic problems of peripheral
accession countries affect the euro area? First, they
create pressure for early entry in the euro area. The
point, again, is that the risk of a self-fulfilling attack
would have been nil if those countries had been
members of the euro area. A “surprise” adoption of
the euro by the CEECs (as advocated by some com-
mentators4) would kill any prospect of a balance
payment crisis in these countries. The problem is
that, presumably, with a critical mass of vulnerable
countries in the euro area, the euro itself would
eventually become vulnerable. We have seen in the
case of Ireland that euro membership did not pre-
clude a sharp contraction of GDP, and such a con-
traction is typically associated with large budget
deficits. Having the troubled CEECs join the euro
would further weaken the overall budget outlook of
the euro area, thus raising pressures for loose mon-
etary policy while fixing another nail in the coffin of
the EU’s Growth and Stability Pact. This point is
especially relevant in light of the issues faced by
some peripheral member countries, as discussed in
the next subsection.
More fundamentally, given the
constraints associated with euro
membership, it is unwise that a
country joins the euro area at a
time of crisis, because prices are
more likely to be incorrect. In the
case of Latvia, for example, we
may assume that entry in the euro
area at current exchange rates
will lead to overvaluation and
therefore be associated with a
prolonged slump in that country.
On the other hand, entry in the
euro area immediately after a
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Table e 5.2 2  
Real l GDP P growth, , Latvia a and d Hungary y 
Latvia Hungary 
2000 6.9  4.9 
2001 8  4.1 
2002 6.5  4.4 
2003 7.2  4.3 
2004 8.7  4.9 
2005 10.6  3.5 
2006 12.2  4 
2007 10  1 
2008 –  4.6  0.6 
2009  – 18  – 6.5 
Source: Eurostat.
Table e 5.3 3  
Inflation, , Latvia a and d Hungary y (%) ) 
 Latvia Hungary 
2007 17  5.5 
2008 11  4.5 
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 5.6
4 Marcin Piatkowski and Krzysztof
Rybinski, “ Let us roll out the euro to the
whole Union”, Financial Times, June 11,
2009.EEAG Report 2010 119
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devaluation may lead to under-valuation, especially if
such devaluation is the by-product of a balance-of-
payments crisis. 
The second issue is that the problems in Eastern
europe may lead to a bailout from Western Europe.
This may happen both because Western banks are
exposed to substantial credit risk in the East, and
because the West may want to inject money in those
economies in order to stabilise them, in particular so
as to avoid a postponement of their joining the single
currency. Indeed, rescue packages were implemented
during the first half of 2009 under the auspices of the
IMF. Such a bailout will make the overall fiscal situa-
tion of euro area countries more fragile. Again, there
is a limit to the extent to which the problems of small
countries can be solved by mutualising their liabilities
and diluting them in a larger, more stable area.
Beyond that limit, the stability of the whole area may
be in danger. If one compounds
the scenario of an Eastern bail-
out with the poor situation of a
number of peripheral member
states and the rapidly rising pub-
lic debt in core countries such as
Spain, Germany and France, it is
not far-fetched to argue that such
a limit may be surpassed. 
4.3 Fiscal imbalances in 
peripheral member states
The third challenge faced by the
euro area is that while it is true
that member countries have
avoided a balance-of-payment
crisis, the safe haven hypothesis is
currently being tested by markets
for the most highly indebted
countries – especially Greece. 
This is apparent when one looks
at the yield on government
bonds of the euro area countries.
Given that these are denominat-
ed in euros, the euro value of a
sovereign bond’s coupon is unaf-
fected by the domestic inflation
rate. Therefore, a higher yield on
such a bond can only reflect the
market’s expectation of outright
default or perhaps an exit from
the euro area and a conversion
of the bonds in the (reintro-
duced) domestic currency. At present such a move is
not on the political agenda of any member country,5
and, in Europe, outright default is only observed in
the context of war or revolution. If in addition to
that one expects that the devaluation of domestic
debt cannot be forced by a balance of payment cri-
sis, due to the protective effect of euro membership,
we would think that the yields on euro sovereign
bonds should be very similar across member coun-
tries. Yet, not only are the spreads substantial, but
they widened considerably during the crisis. Going
back to Figure 3.1, which is reproduced in Figure 5.8
for convenience, we see that for the most ex-
posed countries, Ireland and Greece, they exceeded
250 basis points at the peak. To put this in perspec-
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5 And the consensus view among economists is that it cannot hap-
pen. See Eichengreen (2007). tive, consider that this can be interpreted as a yearly
probability of total default on the debt. Over a ten-
year period, and assuming the baseline country
Germany never defaults, this means that for Ireland
or Greece the market evaluates such an event as hav-
ing a probability of 1 – (1 – 0.025)10 = 22.4 percent.
This is huge. While the tensions have eased some-
what, the spreads remain considerable. If neither
default nor devaluation are possible options, a spec-
ulator could make infinite profits by arbitraging
those spreads away. Therefore, there must be some
reason why default or exiting the euro are more like-
ly outcomes than we thought. 
To see this, let us take the example of Greece. It
entered the crisis with a ratio of public debt over
GDP equal to 100 percent, after more than a decade
of very large trade deficits – this latter feature prob-
ably reflecting an entry into the euro area at an over-
valued exchange rate. In the absence of euro mem-
bership Greece would probably have experienced a
balance-of-payments crisis and massive currency
depreciation, as both exchange rate overvaluation
and high public debt would have created expecta-
tions of loose monetary policy in the future. But we
can see from the evolution of spreads and the more
recent downgrading of Greece’s sovereign debt by
rating agencies that the safe haven mechanism
works at best imperfectly. Public debt is forecast to
hit the 135 percent mark in 2011 (recent revisions of
the deficit put it at some 12 percent of GDP for
2009). Furthermore, the economy is harmed by its
poor export competitiveness and the ability of the
government to effectively increase tax receipts
remains to be proved. As a result, a default triggered
by markets’ expectations of the government being
unable to repay its obligations in the future cannot
be ruled out as a scenario. In such a case, though,
many analysts would typically expect a bail-out to
occur by major euro area countries, perhaps with
the help of the IMF.6 But contagion may well spread
to bigger economies with a debt overhang, such as
Belgium, Italy, or even France (as the latter is rapid-
ly headed toward the 100 percent debt/GDP ratio
mark). In such a case, bail-out would clearly be
impossible and some form of default would have to
occur. It must be the case that markets do not rule
out an incomplete bail-out and/or a contagion sce-
nario that would make a complete bailout impossi-
ble; otherwise we would not observe such high
spreads on Greek public debt.
The other issue regarding Greece is that given the
political climate, it is unclear whether a policy of fis-
cal consolidation or wage moderation will be politi-
cally feasible. Reforms are often met with violent
protests and populist electoral platforms tend to gain
the upper hand, as in the 2009 election when the
Socialist party won with a program of wage increases
and greater public spending. It is possible that a radi-
calisation of Greek politics might lead to new options
such as exiting the euro being considered, and that
such a possibility is already reflected in the behaviour
of markets. 
The lesson to be drawn from this discussion is that
while euro membership provides an insurance against
currency and financial crises, its real effects on periph-
eral countries may lead to such large imbalances that
they may end up in a crisis despite the safe-haven
effect.
One may interpret recent proposals to issue so-called
“euro bonds” backed by future tax receipts of the
European Union as a step toward mutualising claims
between member countries. Given the size of the EU
budget, additional resources to pay for such bonds
must inevitably be the outcome of a strategic game
between countries in which each member tries to shift
the burden of taxation to the others. Typically, we
expect such a game to benefit the more highly indebt-
ed countries. Thus, the euro bonds would create an
implicit commitment of the more virtuous govern-
ments to bail-out the least virtuous ones in the future,
and at the same time generate perverse incentives for
all countries to increase their debt so as to benefit
from such a bail-out. This mutualisation indeed par-
tially helps the most indebted countries, but only by
diluting their fiscal insolvency in a wider geographical
area, while it weakens fiscal discipline in the monetary
union. The end result would be an overall weakening
of the euro and an increase in the risk premium over
euro-denominated assets. 
5. How have member economies reacted to the crisis?
We now discuss how the crisis has affected the various
countries participating in the EMU. In dealing with
the crisis, the euro area faces a number of specific
challenges due to its heterogeneity and the decen-
tralised character of budget decisions. The more the
euro area countries are similar in terms of shocks and
policies, the lower are the costs of having the single
currency. Thus it is important to understand the
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6 See, for example,“Greece: A New Deal?“, BNP Paribas note,
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sources of heterogeneity within the euro area and how
they affect the response to the crisis of each member
country as well as the scope for a coordinated policy
response. We now turn to these issues. 
5.1 Differences in openness
As discussed above, one important transmission chan-
nel is international trade. It is known that different
countries in the euro area have different trade intensi-
ties and therefore different sensitivities to a fall in
world aggregate demand. Figure 5.9 illustrates this by
plotting the fall in the share of exports over GDP dur-
ing the crisis (i.e. between 2007 and 2009) versus the
initial level of openness (measured as imports plus
exports over GDP): bigger exporters have experienced
a larger external shock. 
These differences imply differences in the preferred
policy response to the crisis. Everything else equal,
• a stronger external shock generates a greater
demand for stimulus coming from the policy
authorities, but
• greater openness means that a larger fraction of
the stimulus is going to “leak” through imports, so
that the net effect of the stimulus is smaller.
Since the more open economies had the bigger shock,
these two effects go in opposite directions and it is
therefore not clear what their net response should be.
On the other hand, the more open economies are the
ones that are likely to benefit most from a global coor-
dinated stimulus, whereby the leak-out of activity
associated with imports is compensated by a leak-in
associated with exports. 
5.2 Differences in financial exposure
Second, countries may differ in their sensitivity to
the financial transmission channel. As the above
argument has shown, that channel is stronger, the
larger the fraction of an investor’s portfolio that is
invested in US assets. That fraction clearly differs
across countries, but a look at the data suggests this
is not a big source of heterogeneity. Table 5.4, taken
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005), gives us the
equity share of euro area countries in the US as of
2005. We see that the exposure rate of the larger
countries is around 45 percent, with the exception of
Spain which seems more financially insulated from
the crisis, with only 32 percent of its equity portfolio
invested in US assets. 
Therefore, with the exception of Spain, the rate of
exposure to US assets is not a big source of hetero-
geneity. 
5.3 Different initial conditions
Euro area countries are subjected
to different initial conditions at
the time they enter the crisis.
These initial conditions will in
turn have an effect on the eco-
nomic consequences of the crisis
in a given country, on its margin
of manoeuvre for counter-cycli-
cal policy measures and on the
nature of the policy response
that it prefers. Two important
aspects, in particular, are the evo-
lution of the country’s competi-
tiveness and its trade balance,
Figure 5.9
Table e 5.4 4  
Share e of f US S equity y held d  
by y euro o area a investors s 
euro area  45.8 
Austria   48.2 
Belgium 44.8 
France   42.5 
Germany   45.5 
Italy   44.8 
Luxembourg   42.7 
Netherlands   54.6 
Finland   31.8 
Greece   40.0 
Ireland 46.8 
Portugal 41.3 
Spain   32.4 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005). and its initial budget position.
We have already seen in the case
of Greece that poor initial con-
ditions may lead to a loss of
market confidence and a very re-
duced margin of manoeuvre for
the government. 
An important source of disparity
is that some euro area countries
are more competitive than oth-
ers, meaning that their exports
are cheaper relative to some ref-
erence and their trade balance is
more favourable. These countries
can hope to have increased living
standards and an appreciation of
their real exchange rate in the future, while the others
can expect to have to “tighten their belt” and reduce
their consumption so as to restore external balance.
This means that the crisis, to the extent that it comes
from a reduction in exports, is somewhat more
“harmful” to the second kind of countries relative to
the first. In turn these countries will be more reluctant
to engage in fiscal stimulus, because they are more
concerned by the import leakages. On the other hand,
they are more likely to favour an aggressive monetary
policy because it would tend to lead to a depreciation
of the euro. 
Since the introduction of the single currency, a
creeping divergence in competitiveness and trade
balances had been observed among the four major
countries. This divergence is depicted in Figure 5.10
for the trade balance. We observe that Germany has
been accumulating trade surpluses, Italy remains
more or less balanced although slightly on the deficit
side, Spain has a large deficit and France is gradual-
ly deteriorating, being in a surplus situation at the
onset and now with a deficit which is nearing three
percentage points of GDP. Thus we see substantial
heterogeneity. Ironically, the responses to the crisis
tend to correct those heterogeneities, as Germany’s
exports are plummeting while Spain’s imports are
falling due to the slowdown of activity in non-trad-
ed goods such as construction. In that respect, the
crisis has not exacerbated the imbalances; rather, it
has corrected them. 
These developments are themselves due at least in
part to the cumulative effects of inflation differen-
tials over time. These inflation differentials are
depicted in Figure 5.11, which reports the consumer
price index for the four major euro economies. We
see that Germany is gradually gaining competitive-
ness while Spain is losing com-
petitiveness. In the long run, the
persistence of those inflation
differentials would typically
exert pressure on the euro area. 
It also seems that large trade
imbalances have been accumulat-
ing at the periphery of the euro
area since the establishment of
the single currency. On the one
hand, Ireland has had a very sub-
stantial trade surplus. On the
other hand, Portugal and Greece
have accumulated double-digit
trade deficits. These issues are
documented in Figure 5.12.
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Inevitably, small peripheral countries have little
impact on euro area monetary policy, and that is
the reason why such imbalances may accumulate.
For example, a country with a strong boom driven
by internal demand may gradually accumulate a
positive inflation differential vis-à-vis the other
euro area countries. Such a differential will only
lead to a small increase in the euro interest rate as
the boom affects the inflation rate in the euro area
only to a small extent. And, when the real overval-
uation and the adverse net foreign asset position
start having a negative impact on the economy, it
cannot implement a devaluation, again because its
own recession has little impact on economic condi-
tions in the euro area.7
Member countries also differ in their fiscal margin
of manoeuvre, as we have already discussed in
Chapter 3 of this report. Figure 5.13 shows the evo-
lution of the debt/GDP ratio
over the last decade. It does not
reflect the increment in public
debt associated with the spend-
ing packages of 2009. We see
that there are three types of
countries: “high debt” coun-
tries, with a debt/GDP ratio
greater than 90 percent, “middle
debt countries”, with a ratio
between 50 and 90, and low debt
countries, with a ratio below 50.
For high debt countries, the
margin of manoeuvre in engi-
neering a massive US-style stim-
ulus package is very low. This
would tend to induce them to
support monetary easing, which
would in addition help them to
finance their debt. The middle
debt countries are in a worse sit-
uation than the United States
but they can still afford some
stimulus provided they manage
to commit to stabilise debt when
the economy has exited the
recession. Finally the low debt
countries have a greater margin
of manoeuvre.
Finally, euro area countries are
heterogeneous in their preferences. Historically, some
of them, like Germany, have insisted on price stabili-
ty, while others have been more tolerant of inflation,
resorting to recurrent devaluations to regularly offset
their inflation differential. The latter are more likely
to engage in stimulus than the former, and to be in
favour of aggressive monetary easing. 
This disparity of initial conditions will likely make it
difficult to engineer coordination over fiscal stimulus.
And it also means that we will observe heterogeneity
in the impact of the crisis across countries as well as
in the policy responses to the crisis. We discuss these
two aspects in turn.
5.4 The macroeconomic impact of the crisis
The performance of the main euro area countries dur-
ing the crisis is summarized on Table 5.5, which
Figure 5.12
Figure 5.13
7 The challenges of adjustment for asym-
metrical countries in the euro area have
been discussed in our 2007 report for
Ireland and Italy. reports annual GDP growth between 2008Q3 and
2009Q3. The rate of contraction is similar between
the euro area and the United States. There are sub-
stantial disparities in the contraction rate between
countries: The growth rates range from – 1.7 (Greece)
to – 8.8 (Finland).
If one looks alternatively at unemployment rates
(Figure 5.14), we also find disparities; however, a
paradox emerges. The rise in unemployment does
not match the fall in GDP. France and Spain have
experienced a larger rise in unemployment than Italy
and Germany, while the fall in GDP has been larger
in the latter countries. It is not easy to explain this
pattern. In general, employment may be more or less
cyclical relative to output depending on the cost of
adjusting employment. This cost in turn is affected
by labour market institutions
and particularly by employment
protection. If employment pro-
tection is large, we will observe a
lower fall in employment during
a downturn – workers are re-
tained by the firm and asked to
work fewer hours or to exert
lower effort, thus we observe a
substantial fall in productivity
per worker along with a small
drop in employment rather than
a larger drop in employment and
a lower fall (or even a rise) in
productivity. Since the mid-
1980s, a number of countries
have reduced employment pro-
tection at the margin by easing the use of temporary
contracts and other flexible forms of employment.
In principle, we expect those countries to become
more cyclical in terms of employment, relative to
those that have not engineered those reforms. This
seems to go some way in explaining the sharp rise in
unemployment in Spain, since Spain is the country
where such reforms have been most far-reaching.
However, when one looks at the remaining three
major euro area countries, things are not so clear-
cut. If anything Italy makes more use of flexible con-
tracts than France, yet unemployment has risen very
little there. 
Therefore, other factors must explain the disparity in
unemployment rates. In particular, in Germany a
large program of subsidisation of part-time unem-
ployment has been implemented. In Spain, the sharp
increase in unemployment is related to the fact that a
restructuring of the economy is underway: The con-
struction boom is over and as the reduction in activi-
ty in that sector is perceived as permanent, firms have
no incentive to hoard labour and instead implement
large, immediate employment cuts.
5.5 The fiscal policy response
We now briefly discuss the fiscal policy response of
the euro area economies, referring the reader to
Chapter 3 for further discussion of the fiscal issues.
Figure 5.15, based on Table 3.1, depicts the size of the
budget deficits, as a percentage of GDP, in the
OECD, for year 2009. These numbers differ from the
official “stimulus package” numbers. The latter refer
to the official pro-active measures that are being
implemented over and beyond both the effect of auto-
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Table e 5.5 5  
Real l annual l GDP P growth h between n 2008:Q3 3 
and d 2009:Q3 3 in n the e euro o area a 
Country GDP growth
Austria –  3.7 
Belgium –  3.4 
Denmark
* – 7.0 
Finland –  8.8 
France –  2.4 
Germany –  4.8 
Greece –  1.7 
Ireland –  7.6 
Italy –  4.6 
Luxembourg
* – 5.3 
Netherlands –  4.0 
Portugal –  2.5 
Spain –  4.0 
european Union –  4.3 
euro area –  4.1 
*: data are between 2008:Q2 and 2009:Q2.
Source: OECD.
Figure 5.14EEAG Report 2010 125
Chapter 5
matic stabilisers and of measures
that have been decided indepen-
dently of the crisis. We believe
the total deficit number is a bet-
ter measure: clearly, if a country
has a less ambitious stimulus
package but if its automatic sta-
bilisers are stronger or its fiscal
policy is otherwise more expan-
sionary, it has less need and mar-
gin of manoeuvre for such a
package. 
Overall, the size of deficits in the
euro area is smaller than for the
United States. In many coun-
tries, they are comparable to the
numbers that prevailed during the 1993–94 reces-
sion. We also note a substantial heterogeneity among
euro area countries. Is that problematic? As noted
above, this is to be expected given differences among
member countries in terms of preferences and initial
conditions. However, there are substantial coordina-
tion issues that may be problematic.
First, stimulus in one country increases demand in
another through the channel of international trade.
As a result, to the extent that one’s own fiscal stimu-
lus is costly, one country may want to free ride on the
others’ fiscal expansion. In fact, the more my neigh-
bours are stimulating their economy, the more I want
to take advantage of it by reducing my own spending.
In equilibrium, the level of stimulus is too small and
coordination between countries may improve out-
comes, although coordination does not mean unifor-
mity and the gains from it may be small for those
countries that desire less stimulus. 
Such coordination failure may help explain why the
scale of fiscal expansion in Europe is smaller than in
the United States. Of course, coordination failure is
a problem if governments target the right level of
fiscal spending. The economic literature has pro-
posed some mechanisms by which spending may be
too large. For example electoral considerations may
induce incumbent governments to accumulate too
much public debt. In such a case, the coordination
failure acts as a corrective for the expansionary
biases. 
The other coordination problem has to do with the
interplay between national governments and the
ECB. In an economy with independent central
banks, governments may refrain from implementing
a fiscal expansion because they anticipate that the
central bank will react with an increase in interest
rates to fight the inflationary effects of such an
expansion. In a monetary union, the effects of
expansionary policies in one country are diluted
throughout the union. Since the central bank only
reacts to union-wide macroeconomic developments,
its response to a national government’s fiscal expan-
sion is likely to be small. This generates incentives
for each government to be more expansionary than
absent a monetary union. Of course, in equilibrium
all governments engage in expansionary policies and
the monetary policy is tighter – the monetary union
generates a bias toward lose fiscal policies and tight
monetary policies. It is not totally clear, however,
how relevant this mechanism is in present circum-
stances. Given the level of slack, it is unlikely that
central banks, whether a monetary union or an inde-
pendent national one, would react to additional
stimulus by increasing interest rates. This leads us to
discuss the monetary policy response of the ECB to
the crisis. 
5.6 The monetary policy response
How appropriate has the ECB’s response been to the
crisis? In particular, some analysts complain that the
ECB is not “doing enough”to stimulate the economy.
The response of the central bank has been actually
two-fold:
First, it has acted as a liquidity provider of last
resort in the face of a shortage of interbank lending.
This process amounts to substituting base money,
i.e. money created by the central bank, for “internal
Figure 5.15money”, i.e. money created by the financial sector.
When the financial sector is subject to a collapse in
lending, this reduces internal money and to prevent
broad monetary aggregates from shrinking, one
must provide liquidity to the financial sector. It is
not difficult to evaluate whether this process is being
successful. Absent liquidity injunctions, one would
have observed persistent increases in short-term
interest rates. Clearly, the intervention of the ECB
has avoided this.
Second, it is traditionally believed that reducing
interest rates contributes to an increase in aggregate
demand because it stimulates consumption and
investment. The question is: how important is this
channel at the margin, once one has reached the
zone of near-zero interest rates? If it is important,
then further cuts by 50 basis points could have a
strong effect on economic activity. But that which
determines investment and consumption are the
terms under which private agents can borrow. If
those terms are disconnected from the bank policy
rates, then the economy is in a zone where mone-
tary policy can achieve little. In particular, in a
credit crunch, the total amount of credit has more
to do with the financial institutions’ beliefs about
the characteristics of the borrowers than with the
rate at which they can refinance themselves. In any
case, while the response of the ECB has arguably
not been as aggressive as that of the Fed, in part
because it was not able to do so due to a lower
interest rate before the onset of the crisis; its key
rates fell by three points during 2009. The deposit
facility rate is now at 0.25 percent since May 2009,
down from 3.25 percent in October 2008. This
means that the liquidity trap is not out of sight.
The stimulus effect of such policy is unclear. Artus
(2009) reports a fall in interest rates on loans to
businesses from a peak of 5.5 percent to 5 percent.
This suggests a relatively low impact of monetary
policy on actual lending rates. Incidentally, this rate
is lower than the one prevailing in the US, despite
looser monetary conditions there. Furthermore,
according to Artus, part of this decline is due to a
fall in the demand for loans associated with the
deleveraging process. This further reduces the
impact of ECB policy rates on lending rates. Thus
it does not seem that any further ground for mone-
tary expansion has been by-passed by the ECB. On
the other hand, there is growing concern that the
massive injection of liquidity during the crisis may
be igniting a new asset bubble worldwide, as evi-
denced by the 25 percent hike in stock prices in just
over six months during 2009. 
6. Conclusion
In this Chapter we have discussed a number of chal-
lenges faced by the euro area in the context of the cri-
sis. We can summarise our discussion as follows:
• The risk of a persistent overvaluation of the euro
is not very important. It is unlikely that the
exchange rate will exceed 1.5 dollars per euro.
• Fiscal imbalances of peripheral countries inside
and outside the area, coupled with a severe con-
traction and problems of trade deficits and com-
petitiveness, pose a real risk. 
• To preserve the euro as a stable currency, a wave of
bail-outs should be avoided. Similarly, we do not
recommend introducing indirect bail-out instru-
ments such as the “euro bonds”.
• Nor do we recommend early entry of countries
such as Hungary or Latvia into the euro area on
the grounds that it would solve their internal prob-
lems. Ideally, these countries should have achieved
fiscal and monetary stability before joining the
monetary union.
• If, however, policy-makers were to make the
choice of early accession of CEECs in order to
avoid a balance of payment crisis and a default on
these countries’ external obligations, it is impor-
tant that they enter at the proper exchange rate. In
some cases (e.g. Latvia), this would imply a deval-
uation prior to entry. Even if entry takes place
later in calmer circumstances, proper attention
should be paid to the exchange rate and a devalu-
ation should be considered if necessary, even
though that it would conflict with the philosophy
of ERM-II.
• Finally, we do not find cause for concern in the
fact that monetary and fiscal policies are some-
what tighter in the euro area than in the US.
First, the policy mix is extremely expansionary in
the US, to a point that may be considered coun-
terproductive. Second, in many European coun-
tries the fiscal margin of manoeuvre is reduced
due to a high level of inherited public debt.
Finally, lending rates seem not to react much to
monetary policy rates, implying that the down-
side risks of further monetary easing are more
relevant than any additional stimulus it could
generate.
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